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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2886 
___________ 
 
JASON SCOTT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00929) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 3, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 3, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jason Scott (“Scott”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s opinion 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee UPS Supply Chain Solutions (“UPS”).  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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 Scott began working for Kelly Services, a temporary staffing agency, in 2000.  In 
November, 2008, Scott accepted a temporary work assignment from Kelly Services to 
perform billing and collections at UPS’ Newark, Delaware office.  He executed an 
agreement stating that he was an employee of Kelly Services, not UPS.  (Dkt. No. 61, Ex. 
5, pp. 11-12.)  Scott was paid by Kelly Services and reported to a Kelly Services 
supervisor.  That supervisor was in charge of his vacation and sick leave requests, and 
was also the person Scott contacted if he was going to be late or absent from his 
assignment at UPS.  Scott did not have access to the UPS building and had to be admitted 
by the receptionist after ringing a door bell. 
 Scott was late for, and failed to report to, his UPS assignment on several 
occasions.  After UPS discovered that he falsified a time entry, Kelly Services advised 
Scott that his work assignment at UPS was terminated.  He then continued to receive 
other work assignments from Kelly Services.  Scott, however, believed that he was 
terminated from the UPS assignment due to his sexual orientation.  He filed a complaint 
against UPS alleging that he was subject to discrimination on the basis of gender 
stereotyping, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and on the basis of his 
sexual orientation, in violation of the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“DDEA”).  UPS filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Scott could not 
prove that he was an employee for purposes of Title VII or the DDEA.  By order entered 
June 6, 2012, the District Court granted UPS’ motion, and Scott timely appealed. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 
602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).  Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the 
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). 
 We agree with the District Court that the pertinent facts are undisputed.  (Dkt. No. 
68, p. 8.)  The issue is whether the facts establish that Scott was, or was not, an employee 
of UPS as a matter of law.
1
  To assert a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
Scott must first prove that he was an employee of UPS, and not of Kelly Services, his 
temporary staffing agency.  See Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 
127-28 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that, as under Title VII, “independent contractors are 
not employees within the meaning of the ADEA”).  In order to determine whether a 
person is an employee for purposes of Title VII, the common law of agency and the 
traditional master-servant doctrine applies.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 322-24 (1992).  To that end, the court should consider 
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished [;]  . . . the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the 
                                              
1
 Scott does not meaningfully dispute the District Court’s conclusion that he was 
not a UPS employee.  He only makes the unsupported assertion that the relationship 
between Kelly Services and UPS “can be compared to a contractor and subcontractor.”  
(Appellant’s Br. at 7.) 
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relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party. 
 
Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted). 
 The District Court found that, under Darden, Scott was not an employee of UPS. 
After reviewing the record, we agree with that assessment.  The record demonstrates that 
Scott worked for UPS for about ten months; that he remained employed by Kelly 
Services after his UPS assignment ended; that Kelly Services determined his rate of pay 
and paid him; and that Kelly Services terminated his UPS assignment.  Additionally, 
Scott applied to Kelly Services, filled out its job application, and signed an 
acknowledgement that he was an employee of Kelly Services, not UPS.  Kelly Services 
was in charge of monitoring his daily attendance, vacation, sick leave, and performance 
evaluations.  Finally, Scott did not have employee access to the UPS facility, and had to 
be admitted by the receptionist every day that he reported to work.  The District Court 
properly granted UPS’ summary judgment motion because there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Scott was an employee of UPS.
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2
 The Title VII standards are virtually identical to those of the DDEA. 
